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Abstract
This paper analyzes the explanatory power of mainstream international regime
theories from the international political economy (IPE) literature—neoliberalism, realism,
and cognitivism—through formal econometric techniques. I use a data set based on 162
dispute settlement cases since the inception of the World Trade Organization and find
that the probability of a Dispute Settlement Panel (DSP) forming depends on the share of
exports for a target country as a share of its total exports as well as relative gaps in
military expenditures (as a share of GDP). These results are highly robust to different
model specifications and control variable choice. Though the cognitivist variable does
not yield significant results, this paper represents a positive first step toward more
widespread application and confirmation of regime theories through empirical testing.
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I.

Introduction
Disagreements over the formulation, implementation, and reg ulation of e xternal

trade policy have increased dramatically in recent years, extending beyond the industry or
factor cleavages predicted by standard trade models.1 Joining these interest groups have
been ordinary citizens concerned about environmental deg radation, unsatisfactory labor
conditions and increasing incidences of illegal child labor, and the plight of developing
countries. As a r esult, recent tr ends in intern ational trade hav e spawned a cotta ge
industry of pundits and commentators defending both sides of the free trade debate.2 The
most noteworthy manifestations of this r enewed interest in tr ade have been massive
protests against the status quo of international financial and commercial relations. For
example, Marxists, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and environmental activists
continually fill city streets during World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial or
International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank meetings often decrying the presence of
these international institutions as much as the pattern of exchange that they promote.
Mainstream academic theories about internationa l regimes and institution s posit
that the re gularized behavior they promote reduces uncertainty, transforms zero-sum
games into repeated versions with infinite time horizons, and lengthens the shadow of the
future (or, equi valently, reduces a ctors’ discounting of fut ure periods of st rategic
interaction). In essence, the consensus among most international political economy (IPE)

1

See James E. Alt and Michael Gilligan, ‘The Political Economy of Trading States: Factor
Specificity, Collective Action Problems, and Domestic Political Institutions,’ in Jeffry A. Frieden and
David A. Lake, International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth. Boston:
Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2000, pp. 327-342.
2
Such activity often has led to vociferous responses from the economics community, particularly
from free trade defenders Jagdish Bhagwati and Paul Krugman. See Paul Krugman, Pop Internationalism.
Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996.
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scholars is tha t regimes help mitigate the problems associated with achieving
‘cooperation under anarchy.’
Before proceeding further, a discussion of r egime definition is in order.

In this

paper, I start with Krasner’s (1983) now widely accepted version, which casts regimes as:
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’
expectations converge in a given area of i nternational relations. Principles are beliefs of fact,
causation, and rectitude. Norms are s tandards of behavior defined in terms of rights and
obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions for action. Dec ision-making procedures are
prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice

and consider it to be an inadequate interpretation of institutional patterns of behavior.3
This definition, like mos t other generalizations about re gime dynamics, fails to captur e
parallel patterns of disse nt and discord. In other words, althou gh regimes are d esigned
and maintained in or der to f acilitate the realization of state goals in a n environment of
conflicting preferences, cooperation or resort to regime mediation is not always observed.
In order to e xplore further the duality of regime effects, I focus here on the politicaleconomic determinants of intra-regime conflict and collaboration.

II.

Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to twofold. The primary objective is to determine the

effects (magnitude and significance) of well-known regime theory variables on the
probability of cooperative outcomes in international trade disputes. In other words, what
characteristics of countries embroiled in conflict best ex plain state behavior during the
period of disagreement? What determines whether a trade dispute is resol ved bilaterally
or through the rules and standards of a multilateral trade regime? The second, yet no less
important, objective is to test these theories within the context of the WTO, perhaps the
3

Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983, p. 1.
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most important international trade regime today. Wha t features of WTO member
countries best ex plain variation in the successful use of W

TO dispute settlement

mechanisms? Taken together, the aim of this research agenda is to analyze WTO dispute
settlement dynamics within the context of a regime theory synthesis, the results of which
should shed lig ht on whether the WTO dispute settlement me chanism is servin g the
national interest of states as defined by regime theory.
These research questions are derived from two

important mot ivating sources.

Recent theoretical publications have offered initial hypotheses regarding the persistence
of conflict within international regime structures and the potential for a grand synthesis of
the major paradigms in regime theory.4 While much important qualitative work has been
completed in this domai n, these attempts (to my knowledge) have not included more
rigorous applications to da ta. Mor eover, theory building on inte rnational regimes,
especially within the tradition of political science, tends to focus on the definitions of and
demand for regimes. This paper departs from previous contributions first by avoiding the
long-standing debate on the benefits of regimes and institutions; I assume regimes to be
collective and existence goods for international tr ade negotiators. Second, I embrace an
approach of examining specific regime dynamics over time and across countries using
econometric modeling. Hence, this paper r

epresents a fi rst cut at bridg ing the

methodological gap dividing economists and political scientists throug h the employment
of both economic and political variables in the econometric model.5

4

See Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger, ‘Integrating Theories of
International Regimes,’ Review of International Studies, Volume 26, Number 1, January 2000 for a notable
example.
5
Economists have in large part been engaged in model building, while political scientists prefer
small-n case studies and qualitative theorizing.
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In essence, this particular res earch question embodies but one of man y in the
array of collective action/policy coordination puzzles that confront

and confound

researchers and polic y-makers. Political econom y analyses of multilateral re gimes
naturally focus on those variables that incre ase the probability of cooperative outcomes.
Yet, serious empirical investigations of the viability and robustness of these predictions
are often missing . The choice of a conflict ve rsus cooperation appro ach is a direct
response to Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger (2001) and Keeley (1990), though neither
suggests the fun ctional form analyzed in subsequ ent sections. Unfortunat ely, given the
dearth of similar research, it will be impossible to c ompare my findings with othe r
hypotheses or model specifications.
I find that the neoliberal and realist paradigms (associated with export volume and
relative military expenditures, respectively) are significant determinants of state behavior
within a regime-based framework, interpreting the establishment and use of a Dispute
Settlement Panel (DSP) as a commitment to multilateral cooperation. From the model
estimates, it is clear that these ‘schools’ of international regime theory contain robust
explanatory power with respect to observed behavior in the WTO. Specifically, there is
significant evidence supporting the claim that the neoliberal and realist paradigms are
useful heuristic devices when analyzing patterns of trade cooperation and conflict.
The paper is or ganized as follows. Section III presents a surve y of the r elevant
literature from the pe rspectives of economics and political science. Sect ion IV briefly
outlines the WTO dispute settlement procedure. Se ction V de tails the data set and
construction of the model variables.

Section VI presents the results of the mode l
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estimation. Section VII concludes. An Appendix contains summary statistics on the data
set and all regression output.

III.

Literature Review
The existing literature on international reg imes, though well established in the

political science community, has garnered attention from international trade theorists
only since the advent of regional and global trade institutions. Moreover, since the
amount of data required to empiricall y test a ctivity within the WTO ( or any similar
regime) has just become available, such analyses have yet to be conducted. On the oth er
hand, political scientists have ex plored the nature of regime-based interaction, especially
in the wake of Krasner (1983). These differing approaches and traditions are examined in
this section through a review of the relevant literature, which will provide the necessary
context for empirically testing international regime theories.
Economics
Most of the research conducted within the economics community focuses on the
theoretical implications of international trade negotiations within the WTO. Tr

ade

theorists, however, h ave only recently begun to address the qu estions of institutional
design as well as the benefits of multilateralism and the dispute settlement mechanism.
Maggi (1999) suggests a model in which the W TO dispute settlement procedure allows
for third-party information gathering and multilateral enforcement mechanisms. In short,
the WTO extends the do main of trade ne gotiations beyond strictly bilateral dimensions,
yielding positive benefits in terms of transparency and reputational effects for offending
countries engendered by exposing details about the complaint. Ludema (2000) finds that
8
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uauje

sanctions authorized by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) reduce trade policy
cooperation relative to an environment without t he DSB. Although these findings seem
rather pessimistic, the game-theoretic model used ignores completely the information
gathering and preference aggregating functions of the mechanism. Bagwell and Staiger
(1998) observe that the principles of the G eneral Agreement on T ariffs and Trade
(GATT), which underlie the WTO s ystem, assist g overnments in the ir effort to
implement efficient trade agreem

ents through reciprocity and nondiscrimination.

Rosendorff (2000) portrays the dispute settlement procedure as a mechanism for reducing
rigidity and increasing stability in trade policy. Moreover, he finds that a wider variety of
countries are willing to sign an agreement through a dispute settlement procedure than
without. Sevilla (1998) most resembles this paper’s fo cus, yet differs in its anal ysis of
GATT versus WTO dis pute settlement procedure effectiveness. Importantly, she f inds
that variation in institutiona l design significantly affects state behavior in tr ade
negotiations.

Finally, Anne O. Kreuger’s (1997) volume c asting the WTO as an

international organization includes an early review of the dispute settlement procedure by
legal scholar J ohn Jackson suggesting that t he dispute settlement

procedure is a

theoretically sound means of reducing the risk premium on international trade.
International Political Economy/Political Science
Neoliberal Theories
The dominant paradigm in international regime theory has been termed neoliberal
because of its emphasis on s ystemic convergence of inter ests.6 Not sur prisingly, the
neoliberal approach is biased toward explanations of cooperation or the conditions under
6

The international relations (IR) conception of neoliberalism is similarly a systemic view of
cooperation among states due to shared economic interests.

9
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which cooperation may arise. Theo ries from this perspective borrow heavily from
microeconomic concepts of information asymmetries, transaction costs, and game
theoretic behavior. Keohane (1984), fo r example, underscores the deman d for re gimes
arising from these mic roeconomic deficiencies. As is well known, man y trade dispute
scenarios in the absence of formal or informal institutions can be reduced to a game of
one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma in which the suboptimal outcome of ‘mutual defection’ is a
Nash equilibrium of th e normal form game.

Regimes, argue neoliberal theorists,

transform international economic relations into t he equivalent of dynamic games with
infinite time horizons. With sufficiently low discount rates on future sta ges of play, the
cooperative solution ma y emerge from strate gies of Tit-for-Tat

(player selects

counterpart’s previous strate gy in the nex t stage) or Grim Trigg er (both pla yers choose
the cooperative strat egy until one pla yer defects; then second pla yer defects fo r the
remainder of play).7 B riefly stated, regimes raise the costs associate d with noncompliance in any particular situation, and, consequently, make cooperation more likely.8
Other prominent ideas from the neoliberal pa radigm include Ru ggie’s (1983)
exposition of ‘embedded liberalism.’ Because of the often-disproportionate distributional
effects of trade polic y for various factors of pro duction—namely those t hat control the
use and flows of income to capital and labor—re gimes allow governments to adopt trade
policies as long as they simultaneously provide social safety nets. Embedded liberalism
effectively reflects a particular government’s commitment to remunerating dislocated or
disadvantaged sectors facing competitive pressures under free trade.
7

See Robert Gibbons, Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1992, p. 91 and Kenneth A. Oye (ed.), Cooperation Under Anarchy. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1986, pp. 50-51.
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At the heart of these an d other neoliberal theori es is the proposition that trade
matters to sta tes in te rms of both r eal income and increased consumption se ts to the
extent that sustaining mutually beneficial patterns of trade will impel disputants to reduce
or eliminate the potential for conflict. More over, there is a n implicit assumption in
neoliberal thought that states behave ac cording to ax ioms of economic rationalit y. In
other words, Countr y X will prefer higher levels of income made possible thoug h trade
and, through instrumental reasoning , elects the proper trade polic y for achieving these
and other s elf-interested goals. It is important to note that the neolib eral ‘ontology’
assumes that states are primarily concerned with absolute gains from trade, thereby
framing economic transactions in a positive-sum game framework.

Consequently,

countries have a vested interest in preserving regime structures onc e they are formed,
ensuring that at some l evel those structures are robust to shifts in wealth or cap abilities
within the international system.
Realist Theories
Realist theories of regimes share the same fundamental assumptions of rationality
and self-interested behavior that have char acterized the neoliberal par adigm. The poin t
of departure lies in the underlying motivation for re gime formation and the probabilit y
that regimes will survive shocks to

distributions of e conomic or military power.

Specifically, relative gains often matter and cause regime dynamics to br eak down o r
disappear all together. According to this log ic, states onl y will support and maintain
regimes as lon g as it is in their immediate intere st to do so. F urthermore, without the
presence of a dominant hegemon to coerce acceptance and enforce the ‘rules of the game’
8

Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.35.
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as well as to ‘tax ’ potential free ride rs, regimes will cease to function or demand
attention.9 Thus, realist states heavily discount future stages of pla y in the international
trade game. In a self-help environment, countries are con cerned about the distributions
of goods, technology, and arms among both a llies and adversa ries that result from
relatively free patterns of trade.
Grieco (1993) acknowledges the appeal of the ne oliberal viewpoint, including its
common use of 2x2 Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) games as structural models and its faith in
iterated reciprocal strategies based on Axelrod’s (1984) seminal study. Yet, he concludes
that ‘conditional cooperation among states may evolve in the face of international
anarchy and mixed interests through strategies of reciprocity, extended time horizons,
and reduced ve rification and sanctioning costs [emphasis added] .’10 The thrust of his
argument is that re gimes cannot guarantee the emergence of cooperation. At the end of
the day, regimes fail to alla y the fear of distributional advanta ges accruing to political or
economic adversaries. Grieco thus demonstrates the fundamental difference between his
interpretation and the neoliberal case through the following neoliberal and realist utility
functions, respectively:
Ui = Vi; Ui = Vi - k(Wj – Vi)
(1)
where Ui = utility of state i; Vi = payoff to state i, Wj = payoff to state j≠i, and k = coefficient of
sensitivity

9

See Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1981 and John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions,’ International Security,
Volume 19, Number 3, Winter 1994/95.
10
David A. Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1993, p. 122.
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The coefficient of sensitivity k in Equation 1 measures a state’s responsiveness to relative
gains, or the difference in payoffs accruing to the two states.11 Grieco claims that k may
vary from state to state and from system to system, but the coefficient will always remain
greater than zero. In other words, for a state operating under realist assumptions, relative
gains will always matter. Eve n exchanges with a llies are affected by the k coefficient;
‘gaps in pay offs favoring partners will a lways detract from a state’s utility to some
degree.’12
How well does Grie co’s position, and b y extension that of realist re gime theory,
depict the reality of interstate efforts toward cooperation? If his a rgument that states
always are mindful of r elative gains is valid, th en cooperation is ex tremely unlikely or
even impossible with political and economic ri

vals or when tr ade agreements entail

uneven distributions. Nevertheless, cooperative behavior among allies and adversaries is
an observable phenomenon. In fact, turning Grieco’s criticism of conditional cooperation
on its head, the v alue of k is similarly dependent on a set o f conditions: the number o f
actors, N, engaged in international trade

and the pa yoff structure described by the

appropriate game theoretic framework. Sta ted otherwise, calculations of r elative gains
will be most sig nificant and influential when trade approximates a zero-sum game of
Deadlock and as N → 2.13 Apart from the height of the Cold War era, it is difficult to
identify a peri od that reflects these conditions of extreme bipolarity and irreconcilable
trading positions. As a result, the conditions that elevate relative gains considerations
appear to be extreme, limiting cases that fail to capture the common experience of states.
11

k is assumed to be zero whenever (Wj – Vi) ≤ 0. This makes intuitive sense, since the restriction
implies the absence of any positive relative gains accruing to the second state.
12
Ibid, p. 129.
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In a multipolar world marked by malleable interests and opportunities for
accommodation, most si tuations will fall somew here along a continuum running from
complete cooperation (Harmony) to intractable conflict (Deadlock).
Cognitivist Theories
A third branch of international re

gime theory abandons the assumption of

explicitly rational decision-making according to ex ogenously given preferences. The
cognitive or constructivist paradigm focuses on the role of uncertainty in the international
economic system and the potential fo r knowledge and information to sh ape the way in
which states interact. H asenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger (2000) divide this approach
into weak and st rong variants. The form er refers to processes of l earning among state
actors, bounded r ationality, and other cognitive limitations. F or example, knowledge
about a hi gh technology product imported from Japan or a n ew agricultural chemical
introduced on American farms ma y be unavailable or indecipherable to those charged
with resolving disputes. Thus, we ak cognitivists stress the ‘demand on the part of
decision-makers for reliable issue-specific knowledge.’14 Studies of so-called epistemic
communities have shed light on this ph enomenon and the role o f information in the
complex process of policy coordination.15 Strong cognitivist theories, on the other hand,
are less explanatory theories than approaches to analyzing interstate behavior. W endt
(1992) is a notable example. Among other arguments, Wendt avers that ‘through practice
agents are continually producing and reproducing identities and interests, continuously

13

(1993).

See Duncan Snidal, ‘Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation,’ in Baldwin

14

Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger (2000), p. 10.
A prominent example is Peter M. Haas, ‘Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and
Mediterranean Pollution Control,’ International Organization, Volume 43, 1989.
15
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choosing now th e preferences [they] will have la ter.’16 In a se nse, international affairs
are characterized by a constant state of flux among chosen identities and interests,
thereby denying the rationalist assumptions of neoliberalism and realism.
One major deficiency in the cognitivist approach is its general lack of predictive
power. Such explanations, by nature, tend to abstract from the nuances of reality. Where
they fall short as forecasting tools, howe ver, cognitivist ideas portraying institutions a s
organic social constructions are p articularly useful explanatory variables. This paper in
part attempts to e xtract predictive power from the cognitivist paradigm by applying its
central themes to specific institutional features of the WTO.
The Possibility of Theoretical Synthesis
Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger (2000) accentuate the compatibilit y of
neoliberal and realist regime theories based on the common und erlying assumption of
rationality. Following Keohane (1984), I take rationality to imply
that actors have consistent, ordered preferences, and that they calculate costs and benefits of
alternative courses of action in order to maximize their utility in view of those preferences.17

Indeed, the attractiveness of Keohan e’s argument in After Hegemony lies the use of
traditionally realist theoretical assumptions in a primarily neoliberal argument. This
congruity should be neither controve rsial nor surprising . F or, if both theories presume
that states value either increased trade flows or political security, then there must be a

16

Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power
Politics,’ International Organization, Volume 46, Number 2, Spring 1992, p. 411.
17
Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political
Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 27.
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method of expressing these values as preferences associated with state behavior.18 Thus,
an empirical test includi ng measures of these p references should hav e the potential to
reveal the joint significance of neoliberal and realist theories.
Cognitivist theories, on t he other hand, are not grounded in explicit assumptions
of rationality. In fact, the strong version represents a rejection of rationa lity in favor of
social construction. Oft en borrowing from soci ological theories, arguments from this
perspective deny that preferences are exogenously given according to the vagaries of
international trade, exchange flows, or arms sales. Co gnitivist theories by definition
attempt to uncover the endogenous determinants of state behavior—those conditions and
distributions of knowledge that shape and, in turn, are shaped by international actors.
Given this sufficient basis for a synthesis of neoliberal, realist, and weak
cognitivist regime theories, I proceed to the empirical portion of the paper.

IV.

Dispute Settlement in the WTO19
First, it will be helpful to review the fundamentals of dispute settlement

procedures in the WTO. As part of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations under the
GATT, rules and procedures for handling dispute resolution within the WTO framework
were conceived in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes. One of the highlights of the revised system was a method of preventing any
one Member from disrupting dispute resolution. Whereas under the GATT, states could

18

One potential criticism, however, may be that construing states as unitary rational actors with
well-ordered preferences is wholly inappropriate. For the purposes of this paper, we assume this to be a
sufficient characterization despite the validity of bureaucratic politics models.
19
This section is largely based on a summary in Konstantinos Adamantopoulos (ed.), An Anatomy
of the World Trade Organization. London: Klumer Law International, 1997.
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unilaterally block complaints, the WTO Dispute Settlement mechanism requires a
consensus among disputant(s) and target in order to block the formation of a panel.
A dispute may never reach panel review fo r several reasons. F irst, for a case of
special importance such as t he US-Japanese car import dispute (DS6) or the EU-US
conflict over the us e of the hormones estradiol and testosteron e in th e cattle industr y
(DS26), the Dir ector-General may become personally involved in dispute resolution,
bypassing the panel process entirely. If neither the Director-General nor the disputants
themselves can rea ch an agreem ent, the matter then becomes eligible for DS P
intervention. Alternativel y, the economic sig nificance of a disa greement may not be
sufficient for the establishment of a DSP.
If a DSP conven es, its membership (ran ging from three to five individuals) will
investigate the details of the case and present a f ormal analysis with suggestions for the
proper course of conflict resolution. In order to facilitate the investigation, the panel may
convoke an Expert Review Group. These bodies are analogous to epistemic communities
in that their members are qualified experts in the field of inquiry relevant to the case. The
ERG is solel y an advisory organization and its r eports are distributed to the disputants
and to the DSP for review and comments.
Panel decisions quite often fail to sa tisfy both parties.

When disagreement

persists, the case may be brought before an appellate body, the decision of which is final
and binding (provided the DSB ele cts to adopt the rep ort). Figure 1 in the Appendix
depicts the various stages of dispute settlement according to these provisions. Node s
without subsequent panels are either second ary options from the preceding panel or
possibly intermediary steps between panels.
17
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uauje

These factors, however, only suggest explanations for institutional solutions to
conflict as a function o f the DSB bure aucratic process, wh ereas this paper seeks to
identify theoretical factors that might also induce states to submit to the decisions of
supranational arbiters.

V.

Data and Hypotheses
Theories of re gime-based trade policy examined in Section III may be

summarized according to the ex planatory variables outlined in Chart 1 . This se ction
describes how these theories are translated into falsifiable hypotheses with the use of
economic data. The v ariables outlined below, thoug h borrowed from regime theory, are
not associated with or based on an y previous econometric modeling. I therefore devote
significant discussion to the rationale behind each variable construction and place those
specifications within the c ontext of the regime theories they are intended to r epresent.
Appropriate summary statistics are docum ented in Tables 1 and 2 of the Appendix and
are discussed in the concluding section.
CHART 1 - MAINSTREAM REGIME THEORY EXPLANATORY VARIABLES

Neoliberal
Constellations of
Interest
(usually trade
flows)

Realist

Cognitivist

Power

Knowledge or
Information
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Case Selection
Of the 254 cases registered with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body at the time of
writing, only 75 (30%) have prompted the formation of a DSP. The data set includes 162
of the total cases from DS1 to DS202,

since no subsequent cases wer e examined by a

DSP. Of those, 56 (35%) are identified as panel cases, excluding observations for which
data was unavailable or that were extensions of previous cases. Moreover, for cases in
which more than country is listed as a disputant, the first country to register the complaint
is listed as the disputant. As the Appendi x summary statistics exhibit, a disproportionate
number of cases involve either the EU or t he US. Potential bias

is avoided b y

constructing an EU-US dummy, which is described below.
Dependent Variable
The intensity of conflict in a W TO dispute and its effect on state behavior are
difficult concepts to capture, both in qua litative and quantitative terms. A few potential
candidates for the depen dent variable are: the monetar y value of sanctions imposed in a
settlement package, the length (in days) of a dispute as recorded by the DSB, or the
probability that any potential trade conflict is for mally brought to the attention of the
WTO. Yet, because monetary sanctions have been imposed in only three cases to date20;
the length of a dispute may be a function more of bureaucratic inefficiency than inherent
conflict; and calculatin g the probabilit y measure requires knowled ge of undocumented
disagreements, these formulations are ruled out. Though not a p erfect proxy for conflict
intensity, I have chosen the probability that a case will a ppear before a DSP a s the

20

Rodney D. Ludema, ‘Optimal International Trade Agreements and Dispute Settlement
Procedures,’ European Journal of Political Economy, July 2000.

19
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dependent variable, expressed as the dummy Pn.21 The pr imary benefit of this
formulation, however, i s that it captures disputants’ willing ness to pur sue resolution
through the formal apparatuses of the WTO and thus the extent to which conflict matters
in a trade issue area or requires third party review and consultation.
As discussed in Section IV, bureaucratic or organizational factors may affect the
probability that a case garners the attention of a DSP. Ne vertheless, more nuanced
explanations derived fro m regime theory also sh ould underlie this proba bility function.
The models estimated in the following section are designed to te st the significance of
standard IPE theories as determinants of DSP formation.
Independent Variables
Bilateral Exports as a Share of Total Export Volume
At the heart of neoclassical trade theory is the Ricardian notion of specialization
and trade according to comparative advantage augmented with the Hecksher-Ohlin and
Stolper-Samuelson models. Althoug h patterns of trade may emerge among countries
regardless of factor endo wments or within (rather than across) industries, standard trade
theory posits economic gains for exporters and (under certain restrictions) welfare gains
for consumers. T rade increases income and consumption sets, thereby releasing
populations from the strictures of producing and purchasing all goods domestically.
Consequently, one would expect that countries, especially those that have opted to
abide by the trade rules and standards of the WTO have a common interest in maintaining
high volumes of trade as predicted by neoliberal theories. Simply stated, when a country
is a significant stakeholder in trade and faces the possibility of suspended trade relations
on account of a bur geoning dispute, it will atte mpt to ma ximize its utility function by
21

The dummy takes the values 1 if a panel is established and 0 if not.
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reducing the intensit y of conflict. F rom a game-theor etic standpoint, the dispute
settlement procedure effectively casts a longer shadow of the future onto current stages of
play.
The neoliberal variable Tn is constructed as

EX i → j
EX i

, where t he numerator is the

volume of ex ports from the target country to th e disputant (in millions of constant US
dollars) as a sha re of t he target’s total exports.22 All d ata are taken from the IMF
Direction of Trade Statistics (1995-2000), which are published on a quarterly basis.23 As
a result, the values used are those for the quarter in which the dispute was lodged with the
DSB. B ased on ne oliberal and standard international trade theory, I hypothesize the
following with respect to the trade flows variable:
HYPOTHESIS 1: Greater values for bilateral exports as a share of total exports for
a target country increase the probability that a DSP will be established.
Military Expenditures
Realist regime theory invariably focuses on the role of power relations among
states. These paradi gms define international ec onomic relations in terms of fung ible
capabilities and resources, i.e. assets available to a state that are easily transferable into
political clout. As Gr ieco’s simple model indicates, relative power considerations may
translate into stalled or severed economic relations.
Data with respect to relative gains on a significant scale and across a wide variety
of countries is impossibl e to obtain. Hence, I construct a proxy for the realist paradigm
22

One could argue that a more precise indicator for the neoliberal variable would be the
importance of trade in the disputed sector or industry for the target country measured as the sector-specific
share of total exports. Due to data limitations, the total volume of exports to the disputant country is a
sufficient alternative.
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that makes use of militar y expenditure as a pe rcentage of G DP for the countries in the
data set. In order to ca pture the spirit of relative gains considerations, I use Mn =

MIL j
1−

GDPj
MILi

in order to capture differences in relative military expenditures from

GDPi

equality. This construction, according to realist theory, is related to (though not perfectly
correlated with) the probability of a DSP forming due to the tendency of military rivals to
eschew regime-based solutions to trade disputes.24 Dat a for t his variable are de rived
from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (2001) Yearbook of World
Armaments and Disarmament.25
Thus, a model of disput e settlement should take into account considerat ions of
power balances using this proxy of milita ry expenditures.

In keeping with realist

predictions about regime-based interactions, I claim:
HYPOTHESIS 2: Greater differences in relative military expenditure between the
countries involved in a dispute increase the probability that a DSP will be
established.
Cognitive Dummy
Representing knowledge in the spirit o f cognitivist theory and as a quantitative
regressor is a ne arly impossible task. I therefore make use of th e dummy variable, Cn,
which takes a value of 1 if the dispu ted product comes from a hig h-technology sector
23

Data for the EU-15 are neither averages nor aggregates across Member States. The DTS
Yearbooks have published figures for the European Union from 1995 to the present.
24
Though this is the primary variable construction used, we also include model specifications with
expenditure shares countries entered as individual variables.
25
Like the DTS formulation, the SIPRIS Yearbook calculates data on military expenditures for the
EU-15, though not as shares of GDP. Therefore, the EU figures are divided by EU GDP, taken as an
aggregate across Member States according to World Development Indicators (1999).
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(e.g. computer equipment or satellite navigation systems), chemical or pharmaceutical
sectors, or agricultural sectors and 0 otherwise. The rationale for this specification with
respect to the first two c ategories is str aightforward.26 It is hig hly probable that trade
disputes in those sector s will require some amount of specializ ed knowledge in the
process of the investig ation—knowledge that w ill not necessarily be co ntained in the
general information sets of DSP members. Henc e if unique knowledge a nd information
are important elements in a case, weak cognitive theory suggests that the disputants
would seek the counsel of an ERG. F or example, in agricultural disputes concerning the
safety of food engineered with biotechnolo gical science, an ERG ma y provide the
external, relatively unbiased analysis necessary to reach a scientific consensus.
To be sure, Cn is not a perfect portrayal of the cognitivist paradigm at work. A
more plausible formulation would account for the actual presence of an ERG. Since th e
formation of an ERG is dependent on the establishment of a DSP, endogeneity problems
prevent the use of such an indicator. A more direct test of the cognitive paradigm alone
might take the form of a model testing the hypothesis that the presence of an ERG
expedites the panel d eliberation process and publication of the DSP’s official r eport.
Nevertheless, use of Cn in the probability model leads to the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 3: Cases in which scientific or technical knowledge is integral to the
dispute resolution or in which agricultural interests are at stake increase the
probability that a DSP will be established.
26

I include agricultural cases because of the high incidence of intense conflict in this sector.
Aside from the now infamous European banana regime dispute (beginning with DS27) and the beef
hormones case, work experience at the US Department of Agriculture Food Safety and Inspection Service
(FSIS) suggests that other agricultural cases might have similar ramifications for the dispute settlement
procedure. Indeed, one of the primary roles of the FSIS and the Under Secretary overseeing the
administration is coordination with international regimes, including the World Health Organization and
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Relative Per Capita GDP Ratios
The first control variable makes use of data on per capita GDP for the countries
involved in each dispute. Fig ures are taken from World Development Indicators (1999).
Constructed as 1 −

GDPj
GDPi

, the variable Yn captures the notion tha t imbalances in

economic size will impa ct the de cision of a country or countries to enter into a formal
dispute settlement scheme. Presumabl y, disparities in economic si ze between countries
translate into ca lculations of the dispute’s relative economic importance, at least with
respect to the we althier country.27 Countries with hig her income levels may find it less
worthwhile to e ngage in the formal mechanisms of the dispute settlement process with
developing countries, especially if the disputant s can agree to side p ayments or othe r
concessions. For example, it is unlikel y that a case involving the Slovak Republic and
the US would appear be fore a DSP, since the ‘senior partner ’ (the US) would prefer to
settle the matter outside of the WTO f ramework given the large number of concurrent
pending cases.
Accordingly, I posit the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 4: Greater disparities in GDP levels between disputant and target
increase the probability that a DSP will be established.

Codex Alimentarius Commission, and other countries to resolve trade disputes in accordance with WTO
rules and standards.
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EU-US Dummy
The European Union is listed as part y to a dispute in 67 cases (41%) and the
United States in 91 cases (56%); 28 cases (17%) i nclude both major players. Indeed, one
criticism of this data set may imply that the inclusion of these cases automatically biases
the results toward these observations. Consequently, either country’s presence may be of
interest as a control variable and ma y explain a sig nificant portion of t he variation in
panel formation. In various specifications of the regression model, I include the dummies
EUn and USn.
In order to re main consistent with pr evious hypotheses, it se ems likely that the
joint presence of the EU and US in a dispute case should reduce the probability of a DSP
forming. I ntuitively, the EU and US have much to lose economically from prolonged
conflict and are seldom conscious of military competitiveness, which, when considered
together, should yield more frequent submissions to a panel. Thus, I postulate:
HYPOTHESIS 5: The presence of the EU or the US as parties to a dispute
increases the probability that a DSP will be established.
Democratic Index
The final control va riable, Dn, measures the relationship between the de gree of
political freedom and respect for democratic principles in disputing countries and the use
of DSPs. Co mmitment to civil liberties i s ostensibly, though not necess arily, linked to
transparent political processes and faith in pol itical institutions a s intermediaries in
society. Consequentl y, one may expect to find that more democratic co untries submit
their case to DSPs than do more authoritarian regimes. Undoubtedly, any index of
27

This is assumed to be true irrespective of economic interdependence through trade. In any
event, it is unlikely that non-neighboring states with significant per capita GDP disparities will have large
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democratic freedom will be subject to the particular questions deemed important by the
organization conducting the survey.
The index used in this

analysis is taken f rom the 2001-2002 version

of the

Freedom House Global Survey of Freedom. The data included are indices measuring the
status of political rig hts and civil liberties in a p articular country ranging from 1 (most
identifiable with de mocratic ideals) to 7 ( least identifiable with de mocratic ideals). In
each model, Dn for a g iven country is alwa ys calculated as the aver age of the polit ical
rights and civil liberties indices. However, some model specifications include Dn as the
average index values fo r the two countries co mbined. EU values we re obtained b y
averaging individual Dn values for the 15 Member States.28 Briefly stated, I claim:
HYPOTHESIS 6: The presence of relatively more democratic countries as parties
to a dispute increases the probability that a DSP will be established.

VI.

Model Estimation
The baseline model esti mates in this section were obtained throu gh an ordinary

least squares (OLS) estimation of the linear probability model given by:
Pn = α0 + α1*Tn + α2*Mn + α3*Cn + εn

(2)

where the εn are serially uncorrelated error terms with mean zero. The LPM invariably
entails heteroskedasticity in the error terms, which is c orrected using White’s technique.
Estimation of this simple model yielded the conclusion that trade flows and relative
military expenditures are significantly correlated with the probability of DSP formation.
bilateral trade balances.
28
Index values from 1995 to 2000 are constant for all 15 countries, with most assigned the ideal
value of 1 for both indicators. Inclusion of Italy causes the average value to increase slightly to 1.2.
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Tables 3 and 4 pres ent the regression output, with significance determined at the 5%
level. While the cognitive dummy Cn was not sig nificant in this spe cification, the
positive sign does fit with the prediction of Hypothesis 3. The signs and significance of
Tn and Mn are consistent with H ypotheses 1 and 2, respectively. Interpretations of LPM
estimates differ slightly from traditional OLS techniques; coefficient estimates represent
the probability increase or decrease of observing a dependent variable ‘win’ (in this case,
Pn = 1) for a unit chan ge in the independ ent variable. Ther efore, I conclude from this
model that a unit increase in export shares for a target country increases the probability of
a DSP f orming by 31%, while a unit incr ease in re lative military expenditure gaps
decreases the same probability by approximately 7%. Note the R2 for this estimation is
rather low at 0.04. Nonetheless, R2 is a somewhat dubious measure of goodness of fit in
LPM estimations.29
Included in Table 1 are four additional specifications of the model, each retaining
the three regime theory indicators and ad ding different combinations of the control
variables from the pr eceding section. Model 2 replaces Mn with the simple ratio of
military expenditures (disputant relative to target). This indic ator is also significant and
has virtually the same effect. None theless, I retain Mn in all subsequent estimations.
Model 3 a dds the EU a nd US dummie s, which are both hig hly insignificant. Mode l 4
includes the democratic indices and obtains similar insignificant results. Finally Model 5
controls for Yn and, again, the bas eline results are unchanged. Thus, Model 1 results for
Tn and Mn are gener ally robust to different f unctional forms; that is

they remain

significant and retain their original signs.

29

Values between 0.2 and 0.6 are typically regarded as strong indicators of explanatory power.
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Table 2 pr esents two additional models that make use o

f non-standard

representations of Hypotheses 4 and 6. As expected, Tn and Mn remain significant, while
the null hypotheses that the control variables are zero are not rejected. Interestingly,
however, the highest R2 (0.06) is obtained in non-standard Model 2.
Finally, I revisit the three primary hypotheses and the implic ations of these
findings for international regime theory.

VII.

Conclusion
Clearly, the p receding econometric analysis lends support to a synthesis of

neoliberal and realist regime theories as determinants of state behavior in the WTO.
Given that coeffi cients on both Tn and Mn were consistently significant, one could
interpret this fact as evidence of their joint theoretical utility. If we accept the rationalist
premises of neoliberalism and realism, then this result is not entirely surprising. For, the
estimations undertaken were bas ed on data that directl y captures the economic and
political interests of the countries involved—int erests that appear to affect the way in
which they conduct negotiations and dispute settlement.
Glancing at the summa ry statistics, we can conclude the following about country
characteristics in the WTO dispute settlement process and the role of this mechanism in
achieving state goals from a rationalist perspecti ve. Export shares for tar geted countries
tend to be non-trivial; the mean value for the Tn variable is nearly 15%. With such high
trade volumes at stake, the significance of Tn seems even more natural. Interestingly,
most countries ac counted for in DSB cases are exceptionally democratic. The mean
values for both disputants and tar gets are slightly above the ideal value of 1. Certainl y,
28
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this is affected by the disproportionate number of cases involving the EU and US; but, it
may also point to the fact that the WTO and other multilateral regimes tend, on average,
to attract more democratic states.
What might explain the uniform insignificance of the cognitive variable? As
noted in Section IV, the cognitive variable is certainly an imperfect proxy for the role of
epistemic communities or technical information gathering institutions. Moreover, the
results may have been biased by the inclusion of agricultural cases in va riable
construction, which, ha d they been left out, would have prohibitively reduced the
variance of Cn. The i nsignificance of Cn of course does not inva lidate the cognitivist
research agenda. To be sure, with improvement s in science and technolog y has come
serious disagreement about the validit y of conflicting evidence for and against various
forms of technology in consumer-based economies. Additional steps sho uld be taken to
codify and capture the essence of the cognitivist approach for future empirical analyses.
Other fruitful extensions of this resear ch might include consideration of regional
trade regimes or additional multilateral institutions whose missions a re located at the
nexus of international po litics and economics. Building upon Sevilla (1998), one could
test these hypotheses against the combined GATT/WTO data set used in that paper. As
these considerations are beyond the scope of t his paper, I leave their exploration to the
reader.
The implications of this pa per are clear. Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger’s
call for a theor etical synthesis indeed has merit a nd should be pursued fur ther with other
data sets and samples. Hopefully, this will le ad to a revival of international regime
theory and spawn more research programs that make use of t raditionally economic tools.
29
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More important for policy purposes, though, my findings seem to indicate that the
institutional design of the embattled WTO in fa ct conforms to the interests of states as
defined by standard regime theory. To wit, the dispute settlement mechanism embedded
in its framework maintains an ideal amount of f lexibility for states seeking to r esolve
trade conflict issues. For countries with high stakes in trade, DSPs tend to be established
in order to expedite the settlement process. F or countries concerned about relative gains,
establishment of DSP b ecomes a less likely outcome, reflecting a general disdain for
regime-based solutions. Consequentl y, the nex t logical question that s ocial activists,
commentators, and trade theorists should attempt to answer is not whethe r to abolish the
WTO but how to strengthen further its r ole in reducing conflict in th e international
political economy.
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Appendix
FIGURE 1 – THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURE
Source: Adamantopoulos (ed.), Anatomy of the World Trade Organization, 1997.
Figure not available.
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TABLE 1 – SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT DATA SET
Source: World Trade Organization, 2002
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm>.
Total number of observations: 162

CATEGORY

NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS
56
91
67
28
79
54

Panel cases
United States (US) cases
European Union (EU) cases
US and EU cases
Developing Country cases
Technical or Agricultural cases

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL

41%
33%

35%
56%
17%
49%

TABLE 2 – SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR SELECTED INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
(ALL VALUES IN MILLIONS OF US DOLLARS, EXCEPT FOR DEMOCRATIC INDEXES)
SERIES

MEAN (µ) MEDIAN MAXIMUM MINIMUM STANDARD DEVIATION (σ)

Tn

0.15

0.09

0.88

Mn

0.72

0.43

8.4

0

1

Dn (disputant)

1.66

1.2

7

1

1.15

Dn (target)

1.89

1.2

6

1

1.11

21931.9

26517

44987.6

380.07

11453.1

Yn

0.00019
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0.17

TABLE 3 – REGRESSION OUTPUT (STANDARD CASE)
Dependent variable: Dummy variable (Pn): 1 if DSP established, 0 otherwise
Model Number
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Observations
162
162
162
162
162
Countries
48
48
48
48
48
______________________________________________________________________________________
Constant

0.31
(5.20)

0.34
(5.27)

0.32
(3.89)

0.29
(2.58)

0.31
(5.20)

Tn

0.51
(2.41)

0.53
(2.45)

0.52
(2.46)

0.65
(3.11)

0.54
(2.55)

Mn

-0.07
(-2.78)

-0.08
(-3.14)

-0.06
(-2.55)

-0.07
(-2.74)

Cn

0.03
(0.40)

0.02
(0.30)

0.04
(0.47)

0.03
(0.43)

Milc/Milt

0.04
(0.46)
-0.06
(-2.74)

-0.001
(-0.50)

Yn
EUn

-0.06
(-0.79)

USn

0.04
(0.56)

Dn (disputant)

0.04
(1.25)

Dn (target)

-0.03
(-0.89)
______________________________________________________________________________________
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.05
0.04
R2
Note: White-corrected t-statistics given in parentheses. All regressions are OLS estimates of a linear
probability model.
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TABLE 4 – REGRESSION OUTPUT (NON-STANDARD CASE)
Dependent variable: Dummy variable (Pn): 1 if DSP established, 0 otherwise
Model Number
(1)
(2)
Observations
162
162
Countries
48
48
______________________________________________________________________________________
Constant

0.28
(2.72)

0.32
(3.01)

Tn

0.53
(2.45)

0.66
(3.09)

Mn

-0.07
(-2.72)

-0.06
(-2.34)

Cn

0.05 ,
(0.56)

0.02
(0.22)

Yn (disputant)

-4.64 x 10-6
(-1.27)

Yn (target)

3.95 x 10-6
(1.34)

Dn (average)

0.01
(0.21)
_____________________________________________________________________________________
0.04
0.06
R2
Note: White-corrected t-statistics given in parentheses. All regressions are OLS estimates of a linear
probability model.

34
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uauje

Works Cited
Adamantopoulos, Konstantinos (ed.), An Anatomy of the World Trade
Organization. London: Klumer Law International, 1997.
Baldwin, David A. (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary
Debate. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2001-2002.
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/survey2002.htm>.
Frieden, Jeffry A. and David A. Lake, International Political Economy:
Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s,
2000.
Gibbons, Robert, Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1992.
Haas, Peter M., ‘Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean
Pollution Control,’ International Organization, Volume 43, 1989.
Hasenclever, Andreas, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger, ‘Integrating Theories
of International Regimes,’ Review of International Studies, Volume 26,
Number 1, January 2000.
International Monetary Fund (1995), Direction of Trade Statistics Quarterly.
Washington: International Monetary Fund.
---- (1996), Direction of Trade Statistics Quarterly. Washington: International
Monetary Fund.
---- (1997), Direction of Trade Statistics Quarterly. Washington: International
Monetary Fund.
---- (1998), Direction of Trade Statistics Quarterly. Washington: International
Monetary Fund.
---- (1999), Direction of Trade Statistics Quarterly. Washington: International
Monetary Fund.
---- (2000), Direction of Trade Statistics Quarterly. Washington: International
Monetary Fund.
Keeley, James, F. ‘Toward a Foucauldian Analysis of International Regimes,’
International Organization, Volume 44, Issue 1, Winter 1990.
35
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uauje

Keohane, Robert O., After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World
Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
Krasner, Stephen D. (ed.), International Regimes. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1981.
Krueger, Anne O. (ed.), The WTO as an International Organization. Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1998.
Krugman, Paul, Pop Internationalism. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996.
Ludema, Rodney D., ‘Optimal International Trade Agreements and Dispute
Settlement Procedures,’ European Journal of Political Economy, July
2000.
Maggi, Giovanni, ‘The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade
Cooperation,’ American Economic Review, Vol. 89, No. 1, 1999.
Mearsheimer, John J., ‘The False Promise of International Institutions,’
International Security, Volume 19, Number 3, Winter 1994/95.
Oye, Kenneth A. (ed.), Cooperation Under Anarchy. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1986.
Ruggie, John Gerard, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International
Institutionalization. London: Routledge, 1998.
Sevilla, Christina R., ‘Explaining Patterns of GATT/WTO Trade Complaints,’
Harvard University, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs
Working Paper Series, Paper No. 98-1, January 1998.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook: World
Armaments and Disarmament. Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell, 2001.
Wendt, Alexander, ‘Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction
of Power Politics,’ International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, Spring
1992.
World Bank, World Bank Development Indicators, 1999.
WorldTradeLaw.net LLC, 2002, <http://www.worldtradelaw.net>.
World Trade Organization, 2002, <http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm>.

36
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uauje

